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THE POLITICS OF ABORTION IN THE 
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES IN 1976 
Maris A. Vinovskis* t 
The halls of the United States Congress have reverberated 
throughout our history with noisy and emotional debates over 
divisive issues. Slavery, voting rights for women, and military 
involvement in Vietnam typify the problems that have frequently 
made political service difficult. Most representatives and sena-
tors are pragmatic politicians who feel very uncomfortable with 
any issue that divides the electorate into widely divergent fac-
tions that are unwilling or unable to compromise. Such issues can 
disrupt the normal conciliatory proceedings of Congress, creating 
hostility and bitterness among people who usually expect polite-
ness, if not friendship, from their political opponents. After the 
Supreme Court legalized abortions in January 1973, members of 
the House and Senate found themselves with another volatile 
issue, one so fundamental that it drives antagonists to brand each 
other "murderers" and "baby-killers." 
The battle over federal funds for abortions and the attempts 
to pass a constitutional amendment to prohibit all abortions have 
become annual events that most members of Congress privately 
dread but publicly welcome. As "pro-life" and "pro-choice" con-
stituents descend upon their elected officials each year, repre-
sentatives are forced to face an issue that has no easy legislative 
solution.1 Despite the intensity and disruptiveness of these con-
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search Scientist, Center for Political Studies, Institute for Social Research, University of 
Michigan. B.A. 1965, Wesleyan University; M.A. 1966, Ph.D. 1975, Harvard University. 
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t Funds for this project were provided by a fellowship from the Rockefeller Founda-
tion. The analysis and opinions expressed in this paper are, of course, solely my own and 
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1. The choice of words used to describe the opposing sides of the abortion debate is 
in itself controversial. For example, the use of the term "pro-life" to designate those who 
are against abortions is resented by their opponents because it implies that those who 
favor abortions are "anti-life." Rather than taking sides on this matter, I shall use the 
terms commonly utilized by each faction for themselves. Thus, those groups opposing 
abortions will be referred to as "pro-life" while those favoring abortions will be designated 
as "pro-choice." 
1790 
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frontations, there have been no thorough and independent ana-
lyses of this phenomenon. Instead, most information on the abor-
tion controversy in Congress has come from the understandably 
biased pens of the activists on both sides. Representatives and 
other policy makers are forced to make their decisions without 
fully understanding the political dynamics of the issue. 
This Article will try to remedy that lack of analysis by inves-
tigating the enactment by the House of restrictions on federal 
abortion funding. I will first describe the debates that preceded 
three important votes on abortion; I will then analyze those votes 
using multivariate statistical analysis. 
J. THE CONTROVERSY OVER THE HYDE AMENDMENT 
During the debates on abortion in the late 1960s and early 
1970s, Congress tried to remain aloof. In part, this reflected a 
feeling that abortion was a state matter and that federal interven-
tion was unwarranted. Congress did declare in 1970 that abor-
tions were not to be considered a form of family planning under 
Title X of the Public Health Service Act. No efforts were made, 
however, to prohibit the use of federal Medicaid funds for abor-
tions in states, such as New York, with liberalized abortion laws. 
The Supreme Court's sweeping decision in Roe v. Wade2 per-
suaded pro-life activists to shift their efforts from the state to the 
federal level, and in particular to Congress. Legislators intro-
duced bills in both houses of the 93d Congress to promote the pro-
life position, including proposals to permit individuals and insti-
tutions to refuse to perform abortions on grounds of conscience, 
to restrict federal funding of abortions, and to amend the Consti-
tution to prohibit abortions. While a few of these efforts suc-
ceeded (individuals and institutions were exempted from per-
forming abortions if abortions conflict with their consciences), 
most of these bills failed to pass either in the House or in the 
Senate, and amendments died in House-Senate conference. For 
example, the Senate passed a ban on the use of Labor-HEW 
funds for abortions except when "such abortions are necessary to 
save the life of the mother," but the House rejected it. In general, 
senators in the 93d Congress were more willing than representa-
On the early developments in the efforts to liberalize abortion laws in the United 
States, see sources cited in Vinovskis, Abortion and the Presidential Election of 1976: A 
Multivariate Analysis of Voting Behavior, 77 MrcH. L. REv. 1750, 1751 n.4 (1979). 
2. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
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tives to restrict or prohibit abortions, though most members of 
both chambers were disinclined to expend much time or energy 
on either side of the issue.3 
As the 94th Congress convened early in 1975, few observers 
expected it to enact any additional abortion legislation. The 
House seemed unwilling to budge from its determined opposition 
to restrictions on federal abortion funding and to a constitutional 
amendment limiting abortions. Most pro-life activists expected 
the Senate to lead the fight to restrict abortions, but early in the 
session those hopes were dashed. On April 10, 1975, the Senate 
reversed its position of the previous year by voting 54 to 36 to 
table Senator Dewey F. Bartlett's (R.-Oklahoma) amendment to 
bar federal funding of abortions under the Social Security Act.~ 
Although 1975 was a rather disappointing year for the pro-
life movement, its supporters looked forward to the federal and 
state campaigns in 1976 to elect officials more favorable to a 
constitutional amendment against abortions than those currently 
in office. The decision of the National Conference of Catholic 
Bishops to organize pro-life activity in each congressional district 
stimulated new efforts within Congress itself to force each senator 
and representative to take a public stand on abortion. Though 
most pro-life leaders still had little hope of passing a constitu-
tional amendment in either the House or the Senate in 1976, they 
were determined to obtain at least a roll-call vote on abortion in 
both chambers. 5 
The first major confrontation occurred in the Senate. On 
April 28, 1976, Senator Jesse A. Helms (R.-North Carolina) intro-
duced a constitutional amendment to guarantee unborn children 
the right to life. In order to overcome the unwillingness of the 
Senate Judiciary Committee to report out any anti-abortion con-
stitutional amendments, he introduced his measure as a Senate 
Resolution (S.J. Res. 178) - "With respect to the right of life 
guaranteed in this Constitution, every human being, subject to 
the jurisdiction of the United States, or of any State, shall be 
deemed, from the moment of fertilization, to be a person and 
entitled to the right of life. "6 Following a bitter and emotional 
3. On the developments in the 93d Congress, see Rosoff, Support of Abortion Political 
Suicide?, 17 FAM. PLAN. PERsPEC. 13 (1975). 
4. 121 CONG. REc. 9823 (1975). 
5. On the efforts of the pro-life groups in the 1976 elections, see Vinovskis, supra note 
1. 
6. 122 CONG. REc. 11,556 (1976). 
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debate, the Senate voted, 47 to 40, to table the Helms resolution.7 
The pro-life Senators had suffered another defeat, but they were 
elated by the unexpected closeness of the vote. Eleven senators 
who had voted to table the Bartlett amendment the previous 
year, including such promipent leaders as Senator Edward M. 
Kennedy (D.-Massachusetts), now voted against tabling. One 
pro-life observer put it: 
A SENATE "DEFEAT" THAT WAS A STUNNING 
VICTORY, a whole new political situation, with all the pro-
abortion contenders knocked out - a growing and organized abor-
tion vote - it all adds up to the best news anti-abortion Americans 
have had since the nationwide struggle against abortion-on-
demand started more than three years ago. 8 
Following the success of the pro-life forces in obtaining a roll-
call vote on abortion in the Senate, they tried to bring a similar 
measure to the floor of the House. As in the Senate, their at-
tempts to offer an anti-abortion constitutional amendment were 
stymied whenever they were referred to one of the committees, 9 
so pro-life representatives sought alternative means of getting 
their colleagues recorded on a roll-call abortion vote. Despite 
rumors that pro-life representatives might try to attach an abor-
tion amendment to one of the appropriations bills, observers were 
startled when, on June 24, Representative Henry J. Hyde (R.-
Illinois) offered an amendment to the Labor-HEW appropriations 
bill for fiscal 1977: 
None of the funds appropriated under this Act shall be used 
to pay for abortions or to promote or encourage abortions. 10 
In support of his amendment, Hyde relied on the standard 
pro-life arguments. He contended that a human being is created 
at conception, a human that has at least the right to life. 
I think in the final analysis, you must determine whether or 
4- not the unborn person is human. If you think it is animal or vegeta-
7. Id. at 11,580. 
8. Lifeletter, May 11, 1976, at 1 (emphasis original). 
9. Throughout the debates on the Hyde amendment, pro-choice representatives 
argued that an appropriations bill was not the proper vehicle for dealing with abortion; 
instead, they suggested that the matter be resolved in a debate and vote on a constitu-
tional amendment to prohibit abortions. Most of these pro-choice advocates, however, 
were quite willing to see the anti-abortion constitutional amendments bottled up in the 
Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights and made no effort to bring those 
measures to the floor in order to provide a focus for the abortion debate other than the 
Labor-HEW appropriations bill. 
10. 122 CoNG. REc. 20,410 (1976). 
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ble then, of course, it is disposable like an empty beer can to be 
crushed and thrown out with the rest of the trash. 
And if you believe that human life is deserving of due process 
of law - of equal protection of the laws, then you cannot in logic 
and conscience help fund the execution of these innocent defense-
less human lives. 11 
While some representatives opposing the Hyde amendment 
defended all abortions, others stressed the unfairness of denying 
abortions only to poor women. Representative Daniel J. Flood 
(D.-Pennsylvania), Chairman of the Labor-HEW Appropriations 
Subcommittee and a supporter of a constitutional amendment to 
prohibit abortions, pleaded with his colleagues to reject the Hyde 
amendment: 
I oppose this amendment, and I will tell you why. Listen. This is 
blatantly discriminatory; that is why. 
The Members do not like that? Of course they do not. It does 
not prohibit abortion. No, it does not prohibit abortion. It prohib-
its abortion for poor people. That is what it does. That is a horse 
of a different rolling stone. That is what it does. It does not require 
any change in the practice of the middle-income and the upper-
income people. Oh, no. They are able to go to their private practi-
tioners and get the service done for a fee. But, it does take away 
the option from those of our citizens who must rely on medicaid 
- and other public programs for medical care. 12 
The argument that the Hyde amendment discriminates 
against poor women was to be repeated through the debates in 
Congress. Even the supporters of the Hyde amendment acknowl-
edged that it was not the best way to deal with the issue, but they 
felt it was the only workable strategy at that time - especially 
since the pro-choice forces refused to allow a constitutional 
amendment to be placed before the full House for a vote. As 
Representative Robert E. Bauman (R.-Maryland) put it: 
The gentleman [from Pennsylvania] raises an interesting, 
but I think answerable, point on the grounds that this would dis-
criminate against poor people. The answer is that we have not been 
able to pass a constitutional amendment that would permit the 
right to life, regardless of poverty or wealth. But I do not under-
stand that the child of a poor parent has any less right to live than 
the child of a rich parent. If we could protect the right to life for 
all children, we would do it. But the fact of the matter is, under 
11. Id. 
12. Id. 
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medicaid and other programs that are financed in this bill, the 
Federal Government has been paying for more than 300,000 abor-
tions annually at a cost of $40 to $50 million. 
I think the unborn children whose lives are being snuffed out, 
even though they may not be adults have a right to live, too, 
regardless of the mistaken and immoral Supreme Court decision. 
I do not think the taxpayers of the United States have any obliga-
tion to permit their money to be used in this manner for federally 
financed abortions. That is the only issue here today. 13 
Given the highly emotional nature of this issue, one might 
have expected a prolonged and bitter debate over abortion. Yet 
the initial discussions in the House over the Hyde amendment 
were unusually short. Perhaps this reflected the fact that many 
representatives were caught off-guard and were unprepared to 
join in the debate. Or perhaps most representatives ~ere reluc-
tant to take a strong public position on abortion in an election 
year, when few of them expected the Hyde amendment to require 
a roll-call vote, much less to pass. 14 But the popular expectations 
were wrong. By a vote of207 to 167, the House accepted the Hyde 
amendment- a stunning and unexpected victory for the pro-life 
movement. Later that same day, Representative Bella S. Abzug 
(D.-New York) tried to reverse the earlier decision because she 
claimed that "[a] good number of Members who voted on this 
amendment indicated to us that they had not really understood 
the depth or the breadth of this amendment."15 But by a vote of 
199 to 165, the House upheld the Hyde amendment. 
The stunned pro-choice groups regrouped and concentrated 
their lobbying on the Senate. The pro-life organizations, sensing 
victory, redoubled their efforts and besieged the senators with 
telephone calls and telegrams. On June 28, the struggle reached 
its climax. Senator Robert W. Packwood (R.-Oregon) moved to 
delete the Hyde amendment from the House version of the Labor-
HEW appropriations bill. 16 After an attempt to table Packwood's 
motion failed by a vote of 55 to 27, the Senate voted 57 to 28 to 
strike the Hyde amendment from the bill. Compared to the nar-
13. Id. at 20,411. 
14. When Representative Bauman had tried to attach an amendment to the Labor-
HEW appropriations bill for fiscal 1976 that would have ended federal funding of abor-
tions, he was defeated on a voice vote. When he called for a recorded vote on the issue, 
he failed to muster the necessary 20 votes to obtain a roll-call vote. Planned Parenthood-
World Population Washington Memo, July 11, 1975, at 2-3. 
15. 122 CoNG. R.Ec. 20,423 (1976). 
16. Id. at 20,881. 
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row pro-choice victory over the Helms constitutional amendment 
two months earlier, the defeat of the Hyde amendment was much 
more decisive. In part, the larger margin reflected the unwilling-
ness of some senators to accept the language that would not have 
permitted federal funds for abortions when the life of the mother 
was endangered. The stage was now set for a confrontation be-
tween representatives and senators over a politically and emo-
tionally explosive issue that most members of both chambers 
privately wished had nev~r arisen during an election year. 
Congress had faced a similar situation in 1974. In that year, 
however, it was the Senate that had attached an anti-abortion 
amendment to the Labor-HEW appropriations bill and the House 
that had rejected it. Whe:Q the House-Senate conferees met, they 
had agreed to drop the amendment and rationalized their deci-
sion by stating that 
an annual appropriation bill is an improper vehicle for such a 
controversial and far-reaching legislative provision whose implica-
tions and ramifications are not clear, whose constitutionality has 
been challenged, and on which no hearings have been held. The 
rules and traditions of both the House and the Senate militate 
against the inclusion of legislative language in appropriations 
bills.17 
Yet 1976 was quite different from 1974. Abortion had rarely 
been mentioned in congressional campaigns in 1974, but it was 
highly visible in both the presidential and congressional contests 
in 1976.18 In the summer and fall of 1976, most politicians were 
uncertain about the importance of the abortion issue to voters. 10 
Furthermore, during the deliberations of the 93d Congress, mem-
bers did not hear much about abortion from their constituents; 
members of the 94th Congress, however, were bombarded with 
mail and petitions from both sides. 20 The House-Senate conferees 
in 1976 no longer felt they could duck the abortion issue by simply 
arguing that such a rider was not germane to an appropriations 
bill. 
The House-Senate conferees were under great pressure to 
settle their differences on the Labor-HEW appropriations bill for 
fiscal 1977 quickly, as fiscal 1976 was about to end and new funds 
17. H.R. REP. No. 1489, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 20 (1974). 
18. Rosoff, supra note 3. 
19. Vinovskis, supra note 1. 
20. During the fall of 1976, I visited the offices of 25 representatives and discussed 
the abortion issue with the congressmen or their staffs. Most of them indicated that their 
mail from the pro-life forces was much heavier than that from the pro-choice side. 
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would be needed to keep these agencies in operation. Neverthe-
less, neither the House nor the Senate conferees felt that they 
could back down, since their colleagues were afraid of antagoniz-
ing supporters over the abortion issue just before the election. 
Therefore, though the conferees could resolve seventy-five of the 
seventy-six amendments in disagreement between them, they 
were unable to settle their differences on abortion; as a result, the 
Hyde amendment was sent back to both chambers for reconsider-
ation. 
When the House took up the Labor-HEW appropriations bill 
on August 10, it readily accepted the conference report by a vote 
of 279 to 100. 21 Though some thought that the House might recede 
from its insistence on the Hyde amendment, it soon became evi-
dent that the pro-life camp would not only maintain its majority, 
but would even increase it. Representative Flood, for instance, 
reversed his previous opposition to the Hyde amendment: 
I was concerned that this amendment might be interpreted as 
prohibiting medicaid funds from being used to terminate pregnan-
cies, which might be necessary in some cases to save a mother's 
life. This would be unfair to people who are unable to pay the very 
high costs of medical care which prevail today. I have been per-
suaded that this problem would not be as serious as it might ap-
pear, and that the therapeutic and medical services that might be 
necessary and advised could be paid for by State, local, or private 
funds. 22 
While pro-life speakers tried to minimize the Hyde amend-
ment's termination of federal funds for poor women whose lives 
were endangered by their pregnancies, the pro-choice spokesmen 
emphasized it. When Representative Joel M. Pritchard (R.-
W ashington) moved to concur with the Senate version of the 
Labor-HEW appropriations bill, which did not restrict federal 
funds for abortions, he appealed to those representatives who 
favored abortions in some instances but were politically afraid of 
the pro-lifers in their districts. 
Then there is a third group in this House who, I believe, think 
that abortions are all right in some cases, but they are very, very 
worried about voting at this time, just several months before the 
election. 
Some may feel that this vote will not be recorded or will not 
be known. Even though they admit that in their districts the ma-
21. 122 CONG. R.Ec. 26,780 (1976). 
22. Id. at 26,782. 
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jority of people support abortion and allowing women to make this 
decision - they also realize that a very hard and very skillful 
minority is working very hard - which is their right - and they 
are afraid that they will be punished at the polls.23 
Following a much longer and more spirited debate than the 
one two months before, the House defeated Pritchard's motion by 
a vote of 223 to 150. The 73-vote difference on Pritchard's motion 
signaled a sizable increase in House support for the pro-life posi-
tion and made any attempts to compromise the issue with the 
Senate more difficult. On August 25, however, the Senate re-
jected the Hyde amendment and insisted on its own version of the 
bill by a vote of 53 to 35.24 Nevertheless, pro-choice strength in 
the Senate eroded, as five senators switched from a June 28 pro-
choice vote to an August 28 pro-life vote. 
With the House and Senate again deadlocked, the conferees 
reconvened to seek a compromise that would be acceptable to a 
majority in both houses. The stalemate was finally broken when 
Representative Silvio 0. Conte (R.-Massachusetts) persuaded his 
fellow House conferees to accept a revised version of the amend-
ment, one he hoped would appease the senators: 
None of the funds contained in this Act shall be used to per-
form abortions except where the life of the mother would be endan-
gered if the fetus were carried to term.25 
At first, the senators were reluctant to accept Conte's word-
ing. Senator Edward W. Brooke (R.-Massachusetts), one of the 
leaders of the pro-choice effort in the Senate, offered several 
changes to weaken the Conte proposal even further. But Brooke's 
efforts were in vain and the Senate conferees accepted Conte's 
amendment by a vote of 10 to 5. 26 On September 16, the House 
took up the Labor-HEW appropriations bill again. Since both 
houses had already accepted the conference report on everything 
except the Hyde amendment, the only issue before the House was 
the disagreement over abortion. Representative Flood urged his 
colleagues to accept the compromise wording drafted by Conte as 
the only reasonable way to settle the impasse and enact the $56 
billion appropriations bill for fiscal 1977, whose start was only 
23. Id. 
24. Id. at 27,680. 
25. Id. at 30,895. 
26. For details of the struggles among the House-Senate conferees, see Planned 
Parenthood-World Population Washington Memo, Aug. 27, 1976, at 1-2; National Right 
to Life News, October 1976, at 12. 
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fifteen days away.27 The House ultimately accepted the confer-
ence report by a vote of 256 to 114.28 The next day, the Senate 
concurred by a vote of 47 to 21. 29 Thus, the long and bitter battle 
over abortion had finally ended with a major victory for the pro-
life movement. 
II. PATIERNS OF VOTING ON THE HYDE AMENDMENT IN THE HOUSE 
OF REPRESENTATIVES 
Throughout the debate over the Hyde amendment in 1976, 
analysts of Capitol Hill maneuvering tried to account for its unex-
pected success in the House of Representatives. Their explana-
tions of the voting behavior of the representatives were often col-
ored by their own views on abortion. For example, while pro-
choice analysts emphasized the importance of religion in deter-
mining a representative's vote, with Catholic representatives al-
legedly spearheading the antiabortion effort, pro-lifers denied the 
importance of religion and pointed to the Protestant representa-
tives who supported the Hyde amendment. 
One reason for the difficulty in assessing the relative impor-
tance of various factors in congressional voting is that all of the 
analyses of the Hyde amendment have relied on a simple cross-
tabulation of the data. These analyses calculate the percentage 
of Republicans and Democrats voting for the Hyde amendment 
or the proportion of Roman Catholics, Protestants, and Jews sup-
porting it, but they do not try to estimate the relative importance 
of each of these factors after controlling for the effects of the other 
characteristics of the representatives and their constituents. 311 By 
failing to use multivariate techniques, most studies of congres-
sional voting on the Hyde amendment are too limited to provide 
an accurate explanation of the voting pattern. 
In this analysis I examine the determinants of representa-
tives' votes on the Hyde amendment on June 24, August 10, and 
September 16, 1976. The dependent variable in each case is 
whether a representative supported or opposed the Hyde amend-
ment on that particular roll-call vote.31 To compute independent 
27. 122 CONG. REc. 30,895-96 (1976). 
28. Id. at 30,901. 
29. Id. at 30,997. 
30. For example, see Eccles, Abortion: How Members Voted in 1977, CONG. Q., Feb. 
4, 1978, at 258. 
31. In order to include as many representatives on each roll-call vote as possible, 
those who supported the Hyde amendment included not only those who voted for it, but 
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variables, we assembled data on about 100 different factors for 
each representative, but narrowed our final set of predictors to 
eleven. Four of the independent variables describe the represent-
atives' personal characteristics: age, education, sex, and religion. 
Three variables describe representatives' political lives: their 
party affiliation, the political situation in their district as of Octo-
ber 9, 1976, and their index of voting on other issues in the House. 
The last four independent variables describe the constituents of 
the representatives' home districts: the percentage of the popula-
tion living in urban or suburban areas, the percentage of constitu-
ent families with annual income less than $3,000, the percentage 
of constituents who are black, Spanish, ·or Indian, and the region 
of the country. Though we used additional independent variables 
in some of the analyses, these eleven variables were the core of 
the investigation. 32 
To avoid the limitations of looking at only one or two varia-
bles at a time to explain the vote on the Hyde amendment, we 
used multiple classification analysis (MCA). Multiple classifica-
tion analysis permits us to analyze the relative importance of 
each of the independent variables while controlling for the effects 
of the other variables. Multiple classification analysis also allows 
us to examine the relationship between each subcategory of an 
independent variable (such as the subcategories "Methodists" 
and "Catholics" of the independent variable "religion") and the 
vote on the Hyde amendment after taking the other factors into 
consideration. 33 
also those who were paired for or announced for it (though the latter two were usually very 
few in number). Similarly, those who opposed the Hyde amendment included not only 
those who voted against it, but also those who were paired against or announced against 
it. Unfortunately, since we did not have enough information on the personal, political, and 
constituent characteristics of all representatives, a few of them were not included in the 
analysis even though we know how they voted on the Hyde amendment. Several addi-
tional runs with the missing data were made to see whether any serious biases were 
introduced by these procedures; the results indicate that the MCA runs reported in this 
paper are representative of general pattern of actual voting behavior on the Hyde amend-
ment. 
On June 24 there were two roll-call votes on the Hyde amendment. Since the second 
one was an attempt by Representative Abzug to convince her colleagues to reconsider their 
previous vote (though very few of them actually changed their vote), we used the second 
vote; if, however, a representative had not participated at all on the second roll-call vote, 
his position on the first roll-call vote was used. 
32. Many of the other independent variables, such as whether a representative was 
black or white, could not be used in the final MCA runs because there was such a large 
overlap between it and some other independent variable. 
33. For a more thorough discussion of the use of multiple classification analysis, see 
my description of it in any other essay in this collection. Vinovskis, supra note 1, at 1764-
65. 
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We will consider the relationship between each of the eleven 
independent variables and the vote on the Hyde amendment for 
the three different occasions that produced a roll-call vote in the 
House. As I noted above, the pro-life forces steadily gained 
strength, from 54% on June 24 to 58% on August 10 to 69% .on 
September 16. Part of the difference between the first two and the 
last, of course, may be explained by the changes in the language 
of the amendment to permit federal funding of abortions when 
the life of the mother is endangered. The changes in voting over 
that period, however, may also reflect a decision of pro-choice 
representatives to accommodate themselves to the pressure from 
the pro-life activists in their districts. Therefore, in the balance 
of this Article I will discuss each explanatory variable individu-
ally and note any exceptional changes in predictive power be-
tween votes. 
Our first independent variable was the age of the representa-
tive. In the general population, young adults are usually more 
pro-choice than older Americans.34 Among the representatives, 
the pattern is more complex. Representatives under forty or over 
seventy were the most likely to support the Hyde amendment, 
but votes varied little with age until representatives passed sev-
enty. This pattern held even after we controlled for the effects of 
the other independent variables (see figure 1).' 0verall, the age of 
the representatives was only a moderate predictor of their voting 
behavior (see the beta weights in tables 2, 4, and 6 in Appendix 
A). 
Among the general population pro-life and pro-choice Ameri-
cans show significant differences in level of education. The more 
educated one is, the more likely one is to support the pro-choice 
position. Thus, while 74% of those with a grade school education 
disapproved of the legalization of abortions for mothers who sim-
ply want no more children, only 42% of those with a college edu-
cation disapproved.35 
Any relationship between education and support for the 
Hyde amendment in Congress is complicated by the fact that 
almost every representative has either attended or graduated 
from college. Therefore, we subdivided the representatives by 
whether they had had at least some college training or a B.A., 
legal training beyond a B.A., other education beyond a B.A., or 
34. Blake, The Abortion Decisions: Judicial Review and Public Opinion, in 









Michigan Law Review [Vol. 77:1790 
FIGURE 1 
ADJUSTED PERCENTAGE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
VOTING TO PROHIBIT FEDERAL FUNDS FOR 
ABORTIONS BY AGE OF REPRESENTATIVE 
□ JUNE 24 
~ AUGUST 10 
~ SEPTEMBER 16 
20 40 60 80 100 
PERCENT 
whether the educational level of the representative could not be 
ascertained. One might hypothesize that those representatives 
who had training beyond the B.A. would be less likely to support 
the Hyde amendment and that those with some legal training 
would be the least likely to support it since the constitutionality 
of the amendment was being questioned. 
Representatives with education beyond a B.A. were indeed 
less likely to support the Hyde amendment than those with just 
some college training or a B.A. - even after we controlled for the 
other variables (see figure 2). Although in some situations legally 
trained representatives were more apt to oppose the Hyde amend-
ment than those with nonlegal education beyond the B.A., in 
other situations the reverse was true - probably indicating that 
the constitutionality of the Hyde amendment was never as ques-
tionable to all laWYer-representatives as the pro-choice supporters 
implied during the debates on abortion. After controlling for 
other factors, the educational level of a representative usually was 
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One frequent complaint from the pro-choice people through-
out the debates on the Hyde amendment was that a legislative 
body composed almost entirely of men was making decisions that 
denied women the right to decide whether or not to have an 
abortion. They portrayed the Hyde amendment as the imposition 
of male values on powerless poor women. Several representatives 
and senators clearly implied that if Congress had a higher propor-
tion of female members, the Hyde amendment would have been 
defeated. Thus, Representative Pritchard observed: "Finally, 
Mr. Speaker, if we had had 17 men and the rest of them were 
women, then both of us know that there would be a different 
discussion made today on this decision. " 36 
In the general population women are actually more negative 
about abortions than men, though the difference is quite small.3; 
In the House, however, female representatives were much more 
apt to vote against the Hyde amendment than their male coun-
terparts. For example, 55.3% of male representatives supported 
the Hyde amendment on June 24 and only 27 .8% of female repre-
sentatives endorsed it. Yet after we controlled for the effects of 
the other variables, the differences between male and female rep-
resentatives were considerably narrower (see figure 3). In other 
36. 122 CONG. REc. 30,900 (1976). 
37. Blake, supra note 34. 
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words, though female representatives were more likely to vote 
against the Hyde amendment than male representatives, it was 
due to many factors other than gender. As a result, it is not clear 
that if more women were elected to the House, especially from the 
more conservative districts, they would be any more likely to 
oppose restrictions on federal funding of abortions than the men 
who occupy those seats today. 
Women are powerful in both the pro-life and pro-choice 
movements. One of the difficulties some pro-choice advocates 
have encountered on the Hill is that many male representatives 
feel rather uncomfortable with female activists who do not out-
wardly conform to the more traditional role of women in our 
society.38 As a result, though women are prominent and active in 
both movements, those in the pro-life effort, who tend to accept 
a more traditional image and role for women in society, are often 
more personally acceptable to their congressmen than their coun-
terparts in the pro-choice group. 
0 
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38. When I discussed the relative effectiveness of the lobbyists from the pro-choice 
and pro-life sides with 25 congressional offices, most of the respondents, including th6se 
who voted against the Hyde amendment, felt that the tactics of the pro-lifers were more 
effective; several people mentioned that pro-choice lobbyists were often handicapped 
because they did not fit the stereotype of the traditional American woman. 
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One of the most controversial aspects of the debates over 
abortion is the role of religion in promoting pro-life activities -
particularly the involvement of the Catholic Church. On the one 
hand, most pro-choice activists stress the importance of the Cath-
olic Church and clergy in mobilizing support for the pro-life ef-
forts. The most extreme pro-choice activists see the entire anti-
abortion effort directed and financed by the Catholic Church with 
only token Protestant and Jewish participation. On the other 
hand, pro-lifers are very uneasy and often quite resentful when-
ever the religious issue is raised. Some deny the active participa-
tion of the Catholic Church while others try to justify its involve-
ment. fu any.case, most pro-life supporters feel that the import-
ance of the Catholic Church has been deliberately exaggerated by 
their pro-choice opponents to discredit and discourage any fur-
ther pro-life activity among Catholics and to rally Protestant and 
Jewish support for the pro-choice side. 
During the debates on the Hyde amendment in the 94th 
Congress, the Catholic Church and many of its clergymen were 
actively encouraging their parishioners to support efforts to re-
strict or prohibit abortions. Following the guidelines of the 
"Pastoral Plan for Pro-Life Activities" adopted by the National 
Conference of Catholic Bishops in November 1975, the Church 
hoped to organize Catholics in every congressional district who 
could persuade their officials to support pro-life positions.=19 
Rather than trying to deny the involvement of the Catholic 
Church in pro-life efforts, Monsignor James McHugh, Director of 
the pro-life activities for the National Conference of Catholic 
Bishops, defended it: "I think every church has a right to use its 
political muscle and its political expertise to try to persuade the 
rest of the society to adopt the views that they find consonant 
with their faith and belief, and consonant with the political phi-
losophy of the country itself."40 But McHugh did go on to deny 
that the Catholic Church tries to engage directly in any political 
activity: 
We encourage those things happening, but we do not consider 
that those are uniquely the role of the church. The church stops 
. . . in the public policy area with pronouncements, with encour-
agement, with clarifying issues, with perhaps even testifying before 
Congress. But we do not think that the church or her agencies 
39. Vinovskis, supra note 1. 
40. Transcript of CBS News program, "The Politics of Abortion" (aired April 22, 
1978), at 16. 
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should be involved in this congressional district activity, in this 
election of candidates, in this endorsement of one candidate over 
another. We enumerated those things because those are the kinds 
of activity that we feel citizens themselves should engage in, and 
we were certainly trying to encourage our Catholic citizens to work 
into the political order.41 
The pro-choice spokespeople agree with McHugh's state-
ment that the Catholic Church is trying to influence its parishion-
ers to support efforts such as the Hyde amendment, but they 
strongly disagree with his contention that the Church and its 
clergymen have stopped short of direct political involvement such 
as soliciting contributions or distributing pro-life literature.42 In 
any case, the real question is not whether the Catholic Church 
and its supporters participated in the efforts to enact the Hyde 
amendment, directly or indirectly, but whether they were influ-
ential - particularly among the Catholic representatives. 
Catholic representatives were much more likely to support 
the Hyde amendment than their Protestant or Jewish counter-
parts. For example, 74.7% of Catholic representatives endorsed 
the Hyde amendment on June 24 and only 51.2% of the Presby-
terian, 57.1% of the Methodist, 55.3% of the Baptist, 42.5% of the 
Episcopalian, and 10.5% of the Jewish representatives voted for 
it. Thus, as the pro-choice side has argued, representatives of 
different religions showed significant differences in level of sup-
port for the Hyde amendment. 43 
But did the differences between Catholic and non-Catholic 
representatives on the Hyde amendment disappear after we con-
trolled for the effects of the other variables? Did the religion of 
a representative really influence his vote, or were the patterns 
described above merely coincidental? After we controlled for the 
effects of other attributes of the representatives, the differences 
in voting behavior between Catholic and non-Catholic represen-
tatives not only persisted, but substantially increased (see figure 
4). Catholic representatives were much more likely to vote for 
41. Id. at 17. 
42. For example, see Planned Parenthood-World Population Washington Memo, 
Sept. 17, 1976, at 1-3; National Abortion Rights Action League Newsletter, Sept, 1976, at 
8-7. 
43. Though we do have the religious affiliations of the representatives, we do not have 
any information on other aspects of their religious orientations. For example, it would be 
useful to know which representatives consider themselves evangelical or even which ones 
regularly attend church. If we had additional information about religious belief's and 
practices, religion might be an even better predictor of voting behavior on the Hyde 
amendment than simply knowing their religious affiliations. 
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restricting federal funds for abortions than Protestant or Jewish 
representatives. In fact, after controlling for the effects of the 
other variables, religion was the second best predictor of how 
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Though this analysis confirms the existence of a link between 
religion and support for the Hyde amendment it must be inter-
preted in light of another fact - there are not enough Catholic 
representatives in the House or Senate to account alone for the 
success of the Hyde amendment. On June 24, Catholics consti-
tuted only about one third of those who voted for the Hyde 
amendment. If the Protestant representatives had not split al-
most equally on the issue, the Hyde amendment would never 
have passed; only the Jewish representatives were solidly opposed 
to the Hyde amendment and they are too few to offset the strong 
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support from Catholic representatives. Moreover, although the 
religious affiliation of a representative is unquestionably a major 
predictor of how that person voted on the Hyde amendment in 
1976, it is still not clear what effect pressure from the Catholic 
Church had. Our analysis cannot explain whether the greater 
likelihood of Catholic representatives voting for the Hyde amend-
ment was due to their personal religious values and convictions 
about abortion or to a special respect for the views of the National 
Conference of Catholic Bishops. 
So far we have considered the effects of four personal charac-
teristics of the representatives on their votes on the Hyde amend-
ment; now we turn to some political factors - their political 
affiliation, their political prospects as of October 9, 1976, and 
their index of liberalism on other issues as measured by the per-
centage of times they voted with the recommendations of the 
Americans for Democratic Action. Many representatives, partic-
ularly those in the pro-choice camp, lamented that the Hyde 
amendment had become such a controversial political issue and 
urged their colleagues to vote on the basis of its moral and health 
implications rather than its political consequences. As Represen-
tative Pritchard put it: "I do not believe that the majority of the 
Members favor this amendment. This is not a time to be political, 
it is a time to be concerned with the health of this Nation."H 
Nevertheless the political consequences of voting for or against 
the Hyde amendment were never far from the thoughts of most 
representatives. 
Party affiliation appears to be a very strong predictor of how 
representatives voted on the Hyde amendment. Though Republi-
cans in the general population tend to be more pro-choice than 
Democrats, Republican representatives were much more likely to 
vote to restrict federal funding of abortions than their Democratic 
counterparts. While 73.6% of the Republican representatives 
voted for the Hyde amendment, only 43.9% of the Democrats 
supported it. Given that large difference in support, some com-
mentators have seen this as a party issue, particularly since the 
party platforms and presidential nominees in 1976 also divided 
along party lines on the abortion issue.45 Yet after we controlled 
for the effects of the other variables, the differences between Re-
publicans and Democrats not only disappeared, but on two of the 
44. 122 CONG. REC. 26,783 (1976). 
45. See Vinovskis, supra note 1. 
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three roll-call votes Democrats were now slightly more likely to 
favor the Hyde amendment than Republicans (see figure 5). 
Though party affiliation by itself seemed to be a strong predictor 
of voting behavior on abortion, after we controlled for other fac-
tors it became relatively unimportant. 
0 
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One might suspect that the representatives who faced partic-
ularly difficult reelection battles would be more concerned about 
the political effects of their Hyde amendment votes than those 
who were not running for- reelection or who did not face stiff 
reelection fights. To evaluate the political situation of each repre-
sentative, we relied upon the evaluation of the House campaigns 
as of October 9, 1976, in the Congressional Quarterly, which is 
acknowledged by most Capitol Hill observers as one of the most 
accurate surveys of congressional campaigns. 46 
First, we classified the representatives by whether or not they 
were running for reelection as of October 9, 1976. Among those 
who were not returning, we distinguished those who had decided 
46. CONG. Q., Oct. 9, 1976, Supplement. 
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to abandon electoral politics completely from those who were 
seeking another office, had already been defeated in a primary, 
or had died in office by October 9. We hypothesized that those 
who had decided to retire completely from electoral politics would 
be less likely to be influenced by outside pressure groups than 
those who had left the House for another position, had been run-
ning for reelection earlier and then lost their primary, or had died 
in office (there were very few representatives who had lost in a 
primary fight for reelection or died in office). One must be rather 
careful in drawing general conclusions from the few individuals 
not returning. The incumbents seeking reelection were subdi-
vided into three categories - those whose reelection seemed as-
sured, those whose reelection was likely but not certain, and those 
whose reelection was in considerable doubt as of October 9. An 
overwhelming percentage of House members up for reelection 
were from safe districts and therefore we expected them to be 
more politically able to vote their individual consciences on the 
Hyde amendment than their colleagues facing difficult reelection 
campaigns. 
When we controlled for the effects of other variables, the 
representatives leaving the House usually were much more likely 
to oppose the Hyde amendment than those who were running for 
reelection (see figure 6). Even those who were leaving the House 
to seek another elected office were more likely to oppose restric-
tions on federal funding of abortions than those who were engaged 
in difficult reelection fights - particularly on the votes of June 
24 and September 16. In every situation, the representatives who 
were retiring from electoral politics altogether opposed the Hyde 
amendment more than any of their colleagues. 
After we controlled for the effects of the other variables, we 
found representatives l')seeking reelection from safe districts more 
likely to support the Hyde amendment than their colleagues, 
though the differences were not very sizable. The puzzling thing 
about the results is that the two sets of representatives suppos-
edly the most immune from outside pressure, those retiring from 
electoral politics altogether and those in safe districts, responded 
in opposing ways to the Hyde amendment. Perhaps this is a func-
tion of a small number of cases we have for the representatives 
who are retiring from politics altogether, which may have pro-
duced statistically unstable results. Or perhaps even though out-
side observers considered a district safe, the representative run-
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pro-life activists since any drop in the 1976 margin of victory 
might encourage a more formidable opponent to run in 1978. 47 
While most commentators on the Hyde amendment have 
studied the religious and political affiliations of the representa-
tives, few have speculated about the association between their 
pattern of voting on other issues and the way they voted on cut-
ting federal funds for abortions. From time to time, the pro-choice 
side has chided pro-life representatives for not supporting feder-
ally funded family planning programs or for not voting additional 
money for helping teenage mothers, but not even these pro-choice 
critics have seen the abortion battle as one between conservatives 
and liberals. In fact, many pro-choice activists expect support 
from conservatives since both groups should be able to agree on 
the necessity of removing any government interference with what 
they see as part of the private lives of women. 
To test whether there is a relationship between voting for the 
Hyde amendment and one's position on other issues, it is useful 
to have a measure of voting behavior that identifies a representa-
tive's place on the political spectrum. We used as our index of 
liberalism the percentage of times representatives voted with the 
47. Congressmen from safe districts are often very concerned about future challenges 
to them. For an excellent discussion of the way representatives perceive their constituents 
and reelection campaigns, see R. FENNo, HoME STYLE: HousE MEMBERS IN THEIR DISTRICTS 
(1978). 
0 
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recommendations of the Americans for Democratic Action (re-
moving, of course, the vote on the Hyde amendment from the roll-
call votes used to compute the ADA index). We also used several 
other indices of political orientation, including those put out by 
the AFL-CIO Committee on Political Education, the National 
Farmers Union, the Chamber of Commerce, and the Americans 
for Constitutional Action, in different MCA runs and we had 
results very similar to those produced by using the ADA index. ~8 
The addition of an index of liberalism produced dramatic 
results: A representative's index of liberalism was the single best 
predictor of voting behavior on the Hyde amendment. Even after 
controlling for other factors, representatives who voted with the 
recommendations of the ADA less than twenty-five percent of the 
time were three or four times as likely to vote for the Hyde 
amendment as those who agreed with the ADA position at least 
seventy-five percent of the time (see figure 7). Thus, despite what 
one might infer from the remarks of the news media and Capitol 
Hill observers, a representative's overall liberalism is a much 
better predictor of the vote on restricting federal funds for abor-
tions than any other variable, including the representative's reli-
gious affiliation. 
This conservative-liberal split on abortion funding places 
many pro-life representatives in an awkward position. On the one 
hand, they argue that abortions should not be used as a substitute 
for family planning and that pregnant women should be helped 
by private and public agencies to care for their unborn child so 
that they will not need to resort to an abortion. In fact, the pro-
life position stresses the value of the mother and her child in our 
society and seeks to encourage couples to have children rather 
than abortions. On the other hand, since pro-life representatives 
tend to be more conservative than their pro-choice counterparts, 
they are reluctant to vote for higher federal spending for programs 
designed to prevent unwanted pregnancies or to assist pregnant 
women. On the same day that the House first enacted the Hyde 
amendment, it rejected an amendment by Representative James 
H. Scheuer (D.-New York) to increase family planning funds 
under Title X of the Public Health Service Act.4a Those rep-
resentatives who voted for the Hyde amendment were much 
more likely to vote against the Scheuer amendment than 
48. These indices are available in CONG. Q., Feb. 5, 1977, at 222. 
49. 122 CONG. REc. 20,396 (1976). 
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those who opposed the Hyde amendment, after we controlled for 
the effects of the other variables. 50 Thus, many pro-life represent-
atives had to explain to their constituents why they opposed 
higher levels of funding for family planning programs at the same 
time that they were cutting off federal funds for abortions for poor 
women who did not want ·any more children. 
Finally, we considered the impact of some of the characteris-
tics of constituents in a congressional district on the way that 
representative voted on the Hyde amendment. Unfortunately, 
some of the constituents' characteristics that may be most influ-
ential - such as the religious affiliation of the voters - are not 
tabulated at the level of the congressional district. But we do 
have information at the district level from the 1970 census on the 
percentage of constituents living in urban or suburban areas, the 
percentage of families with incomes less than $3000, the percen-
tage of voters who are black, Spanish, or Indian, and the region 
50. Based on my unpublished MCA investigation of the determinants of voting on 
the Scheuer amendment. 
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of the country in which the district is situated. 51 Therefore, we 
analyzed the significance of those factors. 
Representatives from rural areas were more likely to support 
the Hyde amendment than representatives from the urban areas. 
While 63.3% of the representatives who had less than twenty-five 
percent of their constituents in urban or suburban areas voted for 
the Hyde amendment on June 24, only 45.3% of those with at 
least seventy-five percent of their constituents in urban or subur-
ban areas voted for it. These differences, however, largely disap-
peared when we controlled for the effects of the other variables 
(see figure 8). 
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Since the Hyde amendment ended federally funded abor-
tions for poor women, one might expect that representatives with 
a high proportion of low-income constituents would have been 
more likely to oppose it. Though this was generally true, we were 
surprised to find that after we controlled for the effects of the 
other variables, the strongest support for the Hyde amendment 
on June 24 and August 10 came from those districts with at least 
twenty percent of their families having a yearly income of less 
than $3000 (see figure 9). This variable, like the previous one, was 
51. The census information was obtained from M. BARONE, G. UJIFUSA, & D. MAT• 
THEWS, Tm: ALMANAC OF AMERICAN POLITICS (1975). 
August 1979] Hyde Amendment 1815 
not a particularly strong predictor of voting behavior, but what 
predictive value it had runs collnter to what intuition suggests. 
Personal and political considerations of representatives seem to 
have overridden financial needs of constituents in determining 
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The higher the proportion of nonwhite constituents, the more 
likely the representative was to vote against the Hyde amend-
ment. Though controlling for the effects of the other factors com-
pressed the differences somewhat, the general pattern remained 
the same (see figure 10). Compared to other variables, this one 
was a moderately strong predictor of voting behavior on the Hyde 
amendment. 
During the debates on restricting federal funds for abortions, 
pro-life advocates often charged those who favored abortions for 
poor black women with genocide. As Representative Hyde 
argued: 
All of us should have a particular sensitivity to the concept of 
the word genocide. In New York City, last year for every 1,000 
minority births, there were 1,304 minority abortions. That is one 
way to get rid of the poverty problem, get rid of poor people. Let 
us call that pooricide.52 
52. 122 CONG. REC. 26,785 (1976). 
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Nevertheless, though the pro-life activists openly appealed 
for support from the black representatives and those with a high 
proportion of nonwhite constituents, they failed to make any sig-
nificant inroads. The black representatives rejected attempts to 
end federal funding of abortions as discriminatory against poor 
women - many of whom were black. As Representative Parren 
J. Mitchell (D.-Maryland) observed: 
Clearly then, if the proponents of this legislation are against 
abortion then it is not appropriate for them to prohibit the access 
to abortions for only one class of people. I abhor this type of victim-
ization. This legislation will only approve inequities in the consti-
tutional rights of our citizens and increase the disparity that al-
ready exists among white and black, rich and poor, the economi-
cally and socially advantaged and disadvantaged. 53 
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Overall, the eleven independent variables could account for 
about one third of the variation in voting behavior on the Hyde 
amendment. Compared to other attempts to exlain voting pat-
terns using multiple classification analysis and as many indepen-
dent variables, this is a reasonable and satisfactory level of ex-
planation, particularly since information on some potentially 
important factors such as the religious affiliation of constituents 
was unavailable to us. 
ill. CONCLUSION 
When the 94th Congress reconvened in January 1976, almost 
no one predicted that the pro-life forces would succeed in passing 
an amendment to the Labor-HEW appropriations bill to cut off 
federal funds for abortions except when the life of the mother was 
endangered. Perhaps even more surprising was that the leader-
ship and impetus for this effort cam~ from the House of Repre-
sentatives rather than the Se_nate, since in the 93d Congress the 
House had been firmly opposed to most pro-life legislation. It is 
difficult to explain the sudden success of the pro-life effort in the 
House. Though many representatives genuinely thought that the 
Supreme Court had gone too far in its legalization of all abortions 
in the first six months, subject only to state health regulations in 
the second trimester, most of them did not feel very strongly 
about the abortion issue. In fact, many representatives acknowl-
edged the complexity of the abortion question and privately ad-
mitted that they wished Congress had never become embroiled 
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in the Hyde amendment controversy. Yet a small group of persua-
sive zealots in the House was able to force their reluctant col-
leagues to take a recorded stand on abortion in an election year. 
The success of the pro-life movement is certainly related to 
the uncertainty of most representatives and most other observers 
about the importance of the abortion controversy to the elector-
ate. Though most representatives were not in any real danger of 
being defeated for reelection, they did not want to take any 
chances by triggering an emotional pro-life crusade against them-
selves in their districts. The pro-life forces were particularly effec-
tive at the local level, thanks in part to the active support and 
encouragement of the National Conference of Catholic Bishops 
through its Pastoral Plan for Pro-Life Activities. Some of the 
success of the pro-lifers at the grass-roots level reflected the ina-
bility of their pro-choice counterparts to mount an equally effec-
tive political effort at the level of the congressional district, partly 
because the pro-choice advocates concentrated their attention 
more on national than local lobbying and partly because they had 
great difficulty in arousing their followers to wage as fervent a 
fight on abortion as the pro-lifers did. 
When the representatives placed their plastic cards in the 
voting slots to record their votes on the Hyde amendment, they 
were certainly aware of the political pressures from both sides. 
Furthermore, they overestimated the political saliency of the 
abortion issue by assuming that the emotional intensity among 
the activists in some way reflected the feelings of the general 
public on abortion. Though these outside pressures in an election 
year were undoubtedly necessary ingredients for the pro-life vic-
tory in the House, they still do not explain why some representa-
tives responded positively to the Hyde amendment while others 
chose to oppose it. · 
The personal values and attitudes of representatives about 
abortion certainly played a major role in their final decisions. 
This analysis suggests that representatives who generally tended 
to be more conservative on other social issues or who were brought 
up as Catholics were much more likely to favor restricting federal 
funds for abortions than those who were generally more liberal or 
raised in a Protestant or Jewish environment. Since most repre-
sentatives did not care enough about abortion to make it their 
personal crusade in the House in 1975, one is led to suspect that 
while personal values and characteristics predisposed representa-
tives to respond in certain ways once the abortion issue was forced 
upon them, left to themselves they would have never pushed to 
cut off federal funds from abortions. 
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APPENDIX A 
TABLE No. 1 
VOTE IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ON THE AMENDMENT 
TO PROHIBIT USE OF FEDERAL FUNDS TO PAY FOR OR 
TO PROMOTE .ABORTIONS, JUNE 24, 1976 
(1 = SUPPORTED AMENDMENT/ 0 = OPPOSED AMENDMENT) 
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Education of Representative: 
Some College or BA 62.5 
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Male 55.3 
Female 27.8 
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Status of Representative on 
October 9, 1976: 
Retiring 38.9 
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Class Adjusted Net Number 
Mean Mean Deviation of Cases 
Percentage of Times Voting 
with Americans for Demo-
cratic Action: 
0-24 78.4 82.6 +28.7 139 
25-49 51.7 52.7 - 1.2 60 
50-74 44.6 36.6 -17.3 92 
75 and Above 23.1 24.2 -29.7 78 
Percentage of Constituents 
Living in Urban/Suburban 
Areas: 
0-24 63.3 54.5 + .6 60 
25-49 60.8 57.7 + 3.8 51 
50-74 64.7 56.3 + 2.4 68 
75 and Above 45.3 51.9 - 2.0 190 
Percentage of Constituent 
Families with Incomes Less 
Than $3000: 
0-4 60.7 57.2 + 3.3 28 
5-9 51.1 56.3 + 2.4 180 
10-14 51.2 48.8 - 5.1 82 
15-19 59.3 50.4 - 3.5 54 
20 and Above 64.0 57.3 + 3.4 25 
Percentage of Constituents Who 
Are Blacks, Spanish, or 
Indians: 
0 67.6 55.7 + 1.8 34 
1-4 63.0 64.1 +10.2 92 
5-9 51.6 50.6 - 3.3 64 
10-19 58.3 53.7 - .2 72 
20-29 37.8 49.1 - 4.8 45 
30 and Above 41.9 45.1 - 8.8 62 
Region of Country: 
Northeast 49.5 52.7 - 1.2 91 
North Central 67.0 60.6 + 6.7 106 
South 61.3 57.4 + 3.5 106 
West 27.3 39.4 -14.5 66 
Total 53.9 369 
August 1979] Hyde Amendment 
TABLE No. 2 
VOTE IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ON THE AMENDMENT 
TO PROHIBIT USE OF FEDERAL FUNDS TO PAY FOR OR 
TO PROMOTE .ABORTIONS, JUNE 24, 1976: 
ETA2s, BETAS, AND R2 
Eta2 
Age of Representative .0095 
Education of Representative .0118 
Sex of Representative .0114 
Religion of Representative .0840 
Party Affiliation of Representative .0773 
Status of Representative, October 9, 1976 .0069 
Percentage of Times Voting with Americans 
for Democratic Action .1743 
Percentage of Constituents Living in 
Urban/Suburban Areas .0246 
Percentage of Constituent Families with 
Incomes Less Than $3000 .0081 
Percentage of Constituents Who Are Blacks, 
Spanish, or Indians .0265 
Region of Country .0716 
R2 = .3222 
Note: The Eta2s and R2 have been adjusted for the 
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TABLE No. 3 
VOTE IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ON MOTION 
TO DELETE AMENDMENT PROHIBITING USE OF FEDERAL FUNDS 
TO PAY FOR OR TO PROMOTE ABORTIONS, AUGUST 10, 1976 
(1 = OPPOSED MOTION/ 0 = SUPPORTED MOTION) 
Class Adjusted Net Number 
Mean Mean Deviation of Cases 
Age of Representative: 
25-39 59.3 61.3 + 2.9 59 
40-49 59.1 59.3 + ,9 115 
50-59 54.8 55.6 - 2.8 126 
60-69 58.1 57.7 - .7 74 
70 and Above 77.8 66.5 + 8.1 18 
Education of Representative: 
Some College or BA 68.0 60.9 + 2.5 100 
Some Law Degree 55.0 57.3 - 1.1 211 
Beyond BA ( Other 
Than Law) 52.3 58.5 + .1 65 
Not Ascertained 68.8 56.9 - 1.5 16 
Sex of Representative: 
Male 59.9 58.9 + .5 374 
Female 27.8 48.0 -10.4 18 
Religion of Representative: 
Presbyterian 52.4 36.2 -22.2 42 
Methodist 62.3 48.7 - 9.7 61 
Baptist 57.5 47.4 -11.0 40 
Episcopalian 51.3 55.7 - 2.7 39 
Jewish 15.0 42.4 -16.0 20 
Catholic 79.2 89.1 +30.7 101 
Other 51.9 52.9 - 5.5 79 
Not Ascertained 20.0 31.0 -27.4 10 
Party Affiliation of 
Representative: 
Republican 81.3 62.6 + 4.2 128 
Democrat 47.3 56.4 - 2.0 264 
Status of Representative on 
October 9, 1976: 
Retiring 64.7 46.7 -11.7 17 
Retiring (but running for 
another office), Died, or 
Defeated in Primary 58.8 66.3 + 7.9 17 
Incumbent, Safe District 57.7 60.4 + 2.0 267 
Incumbent, Leaning District 60.3 55.3 - 3.1 63 
Incumbent, Doubtful or 
Unsure District 57.1 48.6 - 9.8 28 
August 1979] Hyde Amendment 1823 
Class Adjusted Net Number 
Mean Mean Deviation of Cases 
Percentage of Times Voting 
with Americans for Demo-
cratic Action: 
0-24 84.9 87.1 +28.7 146 
25-49 51.5 51.7 - 6.7 66 
50-74 51.0 45.9 -12.5 96 
75 and Above 26.2 28.1 -30.3 84 
Percentage of Constituents 
Living in Urban/Suburban 
Areas: 
0-24 71.2 57.9 - .5 59 
25-49 68.5 61.0 + 2.6 54 
50-74 69.3 62.3 + 3.9 75 
75 and Above 48.0 56.5 - 1.9 204 
Percentage of Constituent 
Families with Incomes Less 
'J;'han $3000: 
0-4 60.6 51.5 - 6.9 33 
5-9 54.0 55.1 - 3.3 189 
10-14 59.8 59.2 + .8 92 
15-19 67.3 68.0 + 9.6 55 
20 and Above 65.2 69.2 +10.8 23 
Percentage of Constituents 
Who Are Blacks, Spanish, or 
Indians: 
0 76.9 67.2 + 8.8 39 
1-4 68.7 70.9 +12.5 99 
5-9 59.4 61.1 + 2.7 64 
10-19 61.0 55.7 - 2.7 77 
20-29 41.7 51.7 - 6.7 48 
30 and Above 40.0 39.7 -18.7 65 
Region of Country: 
Northeast 57.4 61.8 + 3.4 94 
North Central 69.3 60.9 + 2.5 114 
South 64.9 60.1 + 1.7 111 
West 32.9 47.6 -10.8 73 
Total 58.4 392 
1824 Michigan Law Review 
TABLE No. 4 
[Vol.' 77:1790 
VOTE IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ON MOTION 
TO DELETE AMENDMENT PROHIBITING USE OF FEDERAL FUNDS 
TO PAY FOR OR TO PROMOTE ABORTIONS, AUGUST 10, 1976: 
Age of Representative 
Education of Representative 
Sex of Representative 
Religion of Representative 
ETA:!S, BETAS, AND R 2 
Party Affiliation of Representative 
Status of Representative, October 9, 1976 
Percentage of Times Voting with Americans 
for Democratic Action 
Percentage of Constituents Living in 
Urban/Suburban Areas 
Percentage of Constituent Families with 
Incomes Less Than $8000 
Percentage of Constituents Who Are Blacks, 
Spanish, or Indians 














Note: The Eta2s and R2 have been adjusted for the 













August 1979] Hyde Amendment 
TABLE No. 5 
VOTE IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
ON THE CONFERENCE COMMITTEE AMENDMENT TO PROHIBIT USE 
1825 
OF FEDERAL FUNDS TO PAY FOR OR TO PROMOTE ABORTIONS EXCEPT 
WHERE LIFE OF MOTHER WOULD BE ENDANGERED, SEPTEMBER 16, 1976 
(1 = SUPPORTED AMENDMENT/ 0 = OPPOSED _AMENDMENT) 







70 and Above 93.8 
Education of Representative: 
Some College or BA 79.8 
Some Law Degree 64.8 
Beyond BA (Other Than 
Law) 63.2 
Not Ascertained 81.3 
Sex of Representative: 
Male 70.6 
Female 37.5 








Not Ascertained 20.0 




Status of Representative on 
October 9, 1976: 
Retiring 60.0 
Retiring (but running for 
another office), Died, or 
Defeated in Primary 57.1 
Incumbent, Safe District 68.9 
Incumbent, Leaning District 75.9 
Incumbent, Doubtful or 
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Class Adjusted Net Number 
Mean Mean Deviation ot Cases 
Percentage of Times Voting 
with Americans for Demo-
cratic Action: 
0-24 90.9 91.6 +22.5 132 
25-49 63.1 63.2 - 5.9 65 
50-74 65.5 60.2 - 8.9 87 
75 and Above 41.8 46.3 -22.8 79 
Percentage of Constituents 
Living in Urban/Suburban 
Areas: 
0-24 81.8 73.8 + 4.7 55 
25-49 73.6 72.2 + 3.1 53 
50-74 81.4 72.0 + 2.9 70 
75 and Above 59.5 65.8 - 3.3 185 
Percentage of Constituent 
Families with Incomes Less 
Than $3000: 
0-4 68.8 67.1 - 2.0 32 
5-9 65.9 72.1 + 3.0 173 
10-14 72.1 71.0 + 1.9 86 
15-19 72.9 59.0 -10.1 48 
20 and Above 75.0 64.0 - 5.1 24 
Percentage of Constituents 
Who Are Blacks, Spanish, or 
Indians: 
0 81.1 72.1 + 3.0 37 
1-4 77.4 78.0 + 8.9 93 
5-9 67.7 68.1 -1.0 65 
10-19 70.1 67.6 - 1.5 67 
20-29 56.1 64.1 - 5.0 41 
30 and Above 58.3 59.9 - 9.2 60 
Region of Country: 
Northeast 62.0 65.0 - 4.1 92 
North Central 80.0 73.5 + 4.4 110 
South 81.2 80.7 +11.6 101 
West 40.0 48.2 -20.9 60 
Total 69.1 363 
August 1979] Hyde Amendment 1827 
TABLE No. 6 
VOTE IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
ON THE CONFERENCE COMMITTEE AMENDMENT TO PROHIBIT USE 
OF FEDERAL FUNDS TO PAY FOR OR TO PROMOTE ABORTIONS EXCEPT 
WHERE LIFE OF MOTHER WOULD BE ENDANGERED, SEPTEMBER 16, 1976: · 
ETA2s, BETAS, AND R 2 
·Eta2 Beta 
Age of Representative .0032 .0951 
Education of Representative .0160 .1!)33 
Sex of Representative .0189 .0682 
Religion of Representative .1182 .3220 
Party Affiliation of Representativ~ .03p3 .0544 
Status of Representative, October 9, 1976 .0076 .1529 
Percentage of Times Voting with Americans 
for Democratic Action .1547 .3890 
Percentage of Constituents Living in 
Urban/Suburban Areas .0409 .0743 
Percentage of Constituent Families with 
Incomes Less Than $3000 .0053 .0990 
Percentage of Constituents Who Are Blacks, 
Spanish, or Indians .0198 .1341 
Region of Country .1001 .2368 
R2 =.3255 
Note: The Eta2s and R2 have been adjusted for the 
degrees of freedom. · 

